

The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy:  
Building a Framework for Comparative Government  
External Communications Research

Robin Brown

Institute of Communication Studies

University of Leeds

Leeds

LS2 9JT

UK

r.c.m.brown@leeds.ac.uk

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## Introduction

Public Diplomacy research and practice wrestles with the question of how can we make public diplomacy better. This paper starts from the position that there is a more fundamental question that we need to answer: why is public diplomacy the way that it is?

This paper starts from two assumptions that a large part of the answer to the question of why public diplomacy is the way that it is can be found in the way in which countries conceptualize their external communications and organize to conduct it.<sup>1</sup> The second assumption is that the best way to approach this question is through comparative research. The literature of public diplomacy is dominated by studies of single countries but it is clear that similar problems and issues recur. It is also clear that there are variations in the organization and conceptualization of external communications activities. This leads to a set of questions about where these differences come from and what difference they make to patterns of activity.

Developing comparisons is difficult because of the relatively limited research base that we have. While the literature in English provides much coverage of US activities research on other countries is much rarer and exists in a fragmented across disciplines. There are significant literatures in languages other than English – for instance in French and German but this still leads to a situation where we know much more about the activities of the major powers than of most countries. However, there are hints that absence of evidence on external communications activities is not evidence of their absence, for instance McMurry and Lee (1947) point to the development of cultural relations programmes by Latin American states as early as the 1920s.

This leads to a second difficulty. In building a comparative framework how broadly should we cast the net? To what extent should activities such as cultural relations (and even more *relations culturelles*) or nation-branding be included within the framework?

The line of analysis developed in this paper suggests that the framework should be wide enough to take in multiple versions of foreign communications both contemporary and historical. The record suggests that countries have frequently had multiple programmes of external communications based on different assumptions and carried out by different organizations. The interaction between these programmes is significant for external publics and particularly for public diplomacy organizations.

Thus the aim in this paper is to contribute to the construction of a framework that is sufficiently inclusive to accommodate varieties of public diplomacy. This requires us to distance ourselves from national or organizational terminologies in order to identify commonalities that exist across border and across time.

The argument proceeds in three stages. I begin by arguing that the historical record of external communications allows us to identify four recurring sets of ideas about the nature and purpose of the activity. These are communications as an extension of diplomacy, as a

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<sup>1</sup> This paper uses the terms public diplomacy and government external communication interchangeably. This is to recognize that many countries do not apply the term 'public diplomacy' to their external communications activities.

mode of national projection, as way of constructing cultural relations and finally as an instrument of political warfare. The step in the analysis is to argue that while these four paradigms are useful in themselves they are most useful when we map them onto national communications organizations, finally, I illustrate the value of the approach by exploring the development of national communications in the UK, France, the US and Germany.

## Method

The paper that follows develops four ideal types of foreign communications activities (Weber 1949). These ideal types are based on an examination on the practices and discourses around public diplomacy in a range of countries. As with any ideal type what is presented here in an abstraction from historical reality and represents a simplification of complex and overlapping arguments. However these types provide a shorthand for recurring ways of thinking and by doing so provide ways for describing and labelling ways of approaching external communications.

At the core of these types is a conception of the international environment. This in turn gives rise to propositions about the purpose and nature of public diplomacy activity and to suggestions about how that activity should be conceptualized.

This set of ideal types then can then be employed in a number of ways.

- a tool for mapping arguments about public diplomacy
- as a way of mapping organizational and national approaches to external communications
- National public diplomacy fields can then be traced across time in terms of the changing prominence of the different positions.

These ideal types are of public diplomacy as extension of diplomacy, as an instrument of cultural relations, as instrument of conflict, and as tool of national image construction.

We already have a number of existing taxonomies of foreign external communications what is the advantage of using a taxonomy based on purposes?

The most common distinctions are drawn from the experience of US Public Diplomacy and reflect long running arguments with the foreign affairs community between 'informationalists' and 'culturalists' (Arndt 2005) . This is sometimes translated into 'advocacy' and 'cultural communications' (Malone 1988).

Alternative formulations are offered by Zaharna, informational versus relational (2009), by Leonard (2002) in terms of time and by Fisher and Brockerhoff's (2008) suggestion of a continuum between listening and telling.

These taxonomies are organized around types of communications but the same types of communication can be used for different purposes. Focusing on purposes moves attention away from how external communication is done to why it is done. This line of analysis suggests that arguments about public diplomacy which appear to revolve around what to do might be more usefully understood competing arguments about purposes rooted in different images of the world.

## The Four Paradigms

In this section I develop the ideal types in turn. It is important to note that in real debates over public diplomacy the paradigms are most clearly defined in debate with each other.

Each paradigm consists of a statement of purpose that follows from a particular analysis of the international environment which in turn leads to some suggestions about the appropriate organization of public diplomacy and means.

### 1. PD is an extension of diplomacy

The first of the ideal types is the one that is least frequently stated explicitly. That is the view that foreign external communication activity is an extension of diplomacy. The role of PD then follows from the conception of diplomacy. Diplomacy is a system of continuing relationships between states and international organizations and groups that seek to influence these relationships. Diplomatic relations are complex ranging across many issues. The purpose of public diplomacy is to engage publics who are relevant to the foreign policy purposes of the state. This engagement will vary across time and will take in different issues and different publics as required. Because of the complexity of international issues, the impact of public opinion on government, and the involvement of non-state actors diplomats have no choice but to expand the range of actors that they engage with.

The organizational consequences of this view are that external communications needs at a minimum to be closely controlled by the ministry of foreign affairs and more likely conducted by diplomats. The primary tools will be media work and engagement with an extended set of relatively elite actors.

One would expect this version of public diplomacy to have been the default view of national foreign ministries but this does not appear to have been the case. For many diplomats what was regarded as 'propaganda' was beneath their dignity and as an unnecessary interference with their core functions such as reporting and conducting negotiating, for instance in the historical attitude of the US State Department to information work and the USIA (Halperin 1974, Warwick 1975)

This is an argument that is gaining more ground in recent years as MFAs deal with the requirements of a post international politics.

We can find examples of this view in documents such as the State Departments Quadrennial Diplomacy Review:

today's most pressing foreign policy challenges require complex, multi-dimensional public engagement strategies to forge important bilateral, regional, and global partnerships, public diplomacy has become an essential element of effective diplomacy (State Department 2010).

Or in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office definition of public diplomacy from its website

Public Diplomacy is a process of achieving the UK's international strategic priorities through engaging and forming partnerships with like-minded organisations and individuals in the public arena. So beyond traditional government-to-government channels, we talk to NGOs, think tanks, opinion formers, young people, businesses and individual citizens (FCO 2012).

In the contemporary era social media provide a cheap and flexible set of tools that can be operated by the diplomats themselves without the need for cumbersome publishing machinery or specialist organizations.

## 2. PD is a matter of national projection

The second paradigm can be labelled national projection. This has reached its most elaborated version in the idea of nation-branding but actually has a much longer history dating back at least to the Universal Expositions of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Dinnie 2008, Jackson 2008). The linking idea is that external communications exist to create an image of the nation in the minds of foreigners a positive image will make foreigners want to support our policies, visit (or emigrate) to our country, invest in our industries or buy our goods and services. In this perspective the dominant image of the international system is of a competitive market place. There is also sometimes a deeper idea at work that if we can show what our country is really like then we will remove misunderstanding and produce an improvement in political relations.

This is an expansive vision of external communication potentially it leads to the involvement of a broad range of social and economic actors. This vision lead back to a recurring concern with content: What is the image that we want to project? Critical scholars have attacked nation-branding for the way that it imposes uniformity on diversity but arguments over identity regularly intrude (Jansen 2008, Kaneva 2011). For instance what sort of art should we send abroad? During the Cold War US public diplomacy was regularly denounced for the type of image that it appeared to show (Arndt 2005). In the late 1960s the Swedish external communications community was engaged in just such struggle how they should present the country (Glover 2011). This type of vision also seeks to reach a broader set of publics than the diplomatic paradigm.

Organizationally this is the most flexible of the four paradigms, indeed recent experience with nation branding suggests that it can be conducted almost entirely by commercial contractors. The characteristic means of communication might include quasi commercial activities including advertising or exhibitions.

## 3. External Communication for Cultural Relations

If national projection clearly exists but has rarely been theorized cultural relations activities have an equally long history but have been regularly addressed.

The central proposition of the cultural relations paradigm is that cultural connections (means) can have political or economic effects. Beyond this core idea there is less consensus. The expected benefits can range from narrowly beneficial to one country to shared mutual advantages The ambiguity is increased by the many meanings of

'culture' within 'cultural relations'. It can include art, but also language teaching, educational linkages and the management of exchanges as well as broader ideas of national culture. Within the rhetoric and practice of cultural relations there is a constant tension between internationalism and nationalism (eg Ninkovich 1981).

These issues become clearer when we consider the various images of the world that underpin cultural relations work. To simplify these can be thought of as the national and the liberal versions of cultural relations. In the national version the world is composed of cultures each with its own distinctive vision of the world. Cultural relations work will lead to growing mutual understanding and appreciation; further, the co-existence of the different cultures will enrich the human experience (Parkinson 1977). In the liberal model the suspicion is that cultures are an obstacle to mutual understanding so the emphasis is more on overcoming these obstacles than the celebration of cultural difference and its expression (Ninkovich 1981). Given that cultural relations work involves individuals or groups rather than cultural wholes the difference between these two positions is less clear in practice. It is not unusual for cultural relations documents to slip between both views.

Although cultural relations work theoretically involves mutuality it is important to note that there is always a degree of instrumentalism involved. Countries maintain these programmes because they see them as beneficial. Further the countries that practice and have practiced cultural relations on the largest scale are those that are persuaded of the value and utility of their country's culture for export. The result is an enduring tendency towards an imbalance in processes of cultural exchange (Mitchell 1986, Kramer 2009). This is exacerbated by the ambiguities around what the relations involve; is it a cultural product that encapsulates cultural distinctiveness or is it about cultural infrastructure, ie are we talking about painting or a university exchange?

We have already referred to the characteristic means of cultural relations but what about the organizational requirements? The usual argument is that the particular requirements of cultural relations work require a degree of insulation from day to day foreign policy work. This requirement follows from several arguments. Cultural relations work unfolds over the medium and long term and cannot be affected by short term priorities. Secondly, cultural relations work needs the cooperation of the cultural sector in the sending country and this is easier to achieve if the organization is politically insulated. Thirdly, this separation from foreign policy will aid the work of the organization in the receiving country (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004).

#### 4. External Communication as political warfare

The fourth type the conflict where communication becomes the tool of military or ideological struggle. In this mode of action the overall objective is the defeat of the opponent. Political warfare aims at the overthrow of the opponent often by aiming at fomenting a rebellion or other transformation in domestic political arrangements (PWE 1942). Although it strategic communication has a range of meanings many statements couched in this language explicitly adopt a conflict mode (eg DSB 2008, Corman et al 2008, Waller 2007)

Communication in conflict focuses on three objectives, demoralizing an opponent, mobilizing allies and supporters and managing the actions of neutrals by preferably mobilizing them to our cause or at least preventing them from going over to our opponents.

While this mode is obviously characteristic of military conflict it is also characteristic of periods of ideological struggle such as the Cold War. Owen argues that international relations since over the past half millennium has been marked by cycles of ideological struggle that do not involve relations between states but their internal governance arrangements. In the past century these are the struggles between democracy and fascism and communism. More recently conflicts around Islamic extremism can be seen in these terms. Less obviously Owen also places the western embrace of democracy promotion within the context of an ideological struggle (Owen 2010). This is a view that would find favour with authoritarian regimes who look askance at the work of Western NGOs but would be rejected by those involved with governance related activities.

Political warfare has a number of organizational implications. Firstly, there is a view that this is a mode of action that cannot be left to diplomats. If diplomacy is about the routine and continuing system of relations conflict is treated as abnormal and hence outside the work of diplomats. There is also a view that diplomats are simply unsuited for the level of directness and conflict required (Waller 2007). Thus political warfare requires an organization detached from the control of the MFA. This view of the need for coordinating mechanisms is reinforced by the involvement of multiple agencies in conflict communications activities, for instance intelligence services, defence ministries and so on (DSB 2008). Operationally, there may be a need for a separation of PW activities from the MFA or the government more broadly, or from the more political parts of government. Political warfare logic tends to claim an overriding priority and the necessity of subordinating all elements of external policy to its requirements

What are the implications of this fourfold classification of external communications?

The most important consequence of these four types is that the different types provides a language that allows us to map different positions on external communication. Rather than treating 'public diplomacy' as a single practice we can identify differing versions of what external communications is. This can be used to describe changes across time. across countries

#### Adding the Organizational Dimension

While the four paradigms contain suggestions about how public diplomacy should be organized how a country organizes its external communications is not merely a product of ideas about public diplomacy. Thus the next step is to consider how to describe the organizational structure of public diplomacy.

An organizational field can be understood as a 'heterogenous set of functionally interconnected organizations' (Knoke 2001: 39) Mapping paradigms onto organizational fields produces a more nuanced understanding of national models and it also suggests lines

of tension within national public diplomacy fields. National approaches to external communication can be described by this intersection of concept and organization.

While advocates of different paradigms will tend to argue for intellectual and organizational separateness of their activities (particularly the often heard argument that 'cultural relations is not public diplomacy') analytically this argument is unpersuasive. Firstly, these activities are conducted by government or government funded agencies and they aim to have an impact on external audiences. Secondly, the existence of these agencies and their relations of cooperation, conflict or competition affects what they are and what they do. Given that one of the most commonly identified problems with external communication is lack of coordination it is important pay attention to the dynamics of these organizational fields.

In many countries public diplomacy functions are spread across multiple organizations. . These organizations provide a division of labour and have different relations of control and finance and different groups of stakeholders. For instance in the UK the Foreign Office website identifies its main 'public diplomacy partners' as the British Council, BBC World Service, Wilton Park conference centre but also discusses a current promotional campaign that involves UK Trade and Investment and Visit Britain the tourism organization

Adding an explicit organizational dimension to the analysis of public diplomacy recognizes bureaucracy is not just a source of problems but it is one of the defining elements of the activity (Wilson 1989). Real cases also show the influence of path dependencies where the origins and sequence of organizational formation influences long term patterns of how countries approach public diplomacy (Pierson 2004).

#### Four Cases: Paradigms and Organizational Fields

The next section of the paper examines the external communications approach of four countries with a considerable history in the area using this combination of paradigms and organizations . By looking at evolution across time it is possible to see both a high degree of stability in national approaches but also elements of change. It is also possible to see how national assumptions differ. The analysis also suggests the utility of combining organizational and paradigm analysis in that organizational differences have a considerable impact on how external communications actually function.

##### 1. France: Cultural Relations with a Dominant MFA

France claims the mantle of the pioneer of institutionalized external communications (Roche and Pigniau 1995).

Although France is traditionally seen as an exemplar of dirigisme the origins of external communications lie in private efforts at *rayonnement culturelle* – cultural projection - of France. The key element here is the emergence of popular forms of nationalism that stimulated sections of the French public to support actions that would spread French influence in the world. The earliest of these is the support for French educational work by missionary organizations in the Middle East from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. By 1914 several hundred schools were operating in the region (Burrows 1986). In 1883 prominent



figures came together to create the Alliance Française an organization with a much broader remit that would organize local groups of Francophiles to promote French language and culture (Chaubet 2006).

Even at this early stage, French conceptualizations of cultural relations showed the basic ambiguities of the concept. French culture is both national and universal. Through a policy of *rayonnement culturelle* foreigners would both benefit from their exposure to French culture and while France will also benefit from the consequential interest in France and its culture (Paschalidis 2009).

By the end of closing decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century these private organizations were receiving subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1909 *Service des Ecoles et des Oeuvres Françaises à l'étranger* created and elevated into a *Bureau* in 1910. In 1910 the first Cultural Institutes were created in Florence and London. As in the other belligerents the outbreak of the First World War led to huge expansions of the international communications organizations. In retrospect how countries responded to the emergence of peace seems to have had a major long term effect. As the wartime communications organizations were dismantled France created in the *Service d'Information et de Presse* and the *Service des Oeuvres françaises à l'étranger* the Ministry (Lauren 1976). During the interwar period external communications were squeezed between rising international competition and the economic situation. The existence the network of schools, Alliance Françaises and cultural institutes exerted a heavy pull on the work of the Quai D'Orsay including its budget but there seems to have been little attempt to develop a comprehensive communication strategy (Young 2004).

With the post liberation reorganization of the MFA the significance of cultural work was recognized by the formation *Direction Generale des relations Culturelles et Service des Oeuvres françaises a l'étranger*. Over the past decade a more economically based concern with national projection has emerged alongside the emphasis on cultural relations, and *relations culturelle* has been downgraded from the status of Directorate-Generale to a Directorate but despite reorganizations and renaming culture has remained a central element of French policy.

In 2011 France created a new organization the French Institute that would provide a central support mechanism for the cultural network and would directly manage some of the cultural institutes. the French Institute, outside the MFA although still under its influence. The new organization was explicitly seen as a competitor to the the BC and the Goethe Institut (MAEE 2010, Institut Française 2011).

In recent decades French diplomacy has exerted considerable efforts to promote ideas of cultural diversity notably through the conclusion of the Convention of the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This convention can be seen as an effort to shore up barriers to American cultural hegemony and that of English as a global language but there is more to it. Cultural relations are not only an instrument for policy but a field of action in themselves. In this respect the French action is close Nye's original formulations of soft power where setting the rules of the game become a source of influence. Increasing the significance of culture plays into France's perceived areas of strength thus by shifting issues

from other areas into the cultural domain France increases its influence (Pendergast 1976, Nye 1990, Singh 2011)

In paradigmatic terms French external communication has been almost entirely dominated by a cultural relations paradigm with a central role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education. How can we account for this? My argument would be that French policy emerges from an identification of language with culture which in turn means the nation but also the state (Greenfeld 1992). The central role of the state in the promotion of culture does not appear to raise any of the particular concerns over credibility or autonomy that recur in US or American discussions of cultural relations. For instance while the 'About us' sections of the web sites of the BBC World Service and VoA explain their relationship to their governments that of France 24 feels no such need and even consulting the website of the parent company adds little extra to the reader's understanding of the arrangement.

## 2. The UK: MFA Dominance in a Plural System

From a perspective of the four ideal types the UK is unusual because it is the case that has come closest to consistently embracing the view of external communication as a routine part of diplomacy. This appears to be something of historical accident. At the beginning of the First World War all the major combatants sprouted special propaganda organizations which over time led to the creation of cross governmental communications organizations in the UK this took the form of the Ministry of Information. At the end of the war the FO was firmly against the continuation of the Mol and was happy to reabsorb the leftovers.<sup>2</sup> While some elements of the ministry were happy to get out of the propaganda business another faction was determined to preserve the capability to explain British policy (Taylor 1981).

As postwar financial retrenchment reduced the specialist resources available Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary circulated an instruction to British posts abroad in May 1919. 'British propaganda in Foreign Countries shall, in future, be regarded as part of the regular work of His Majesty's Missions Abroad.' Explaining that in most countries it would not be possible to continue the war time arrangement of having special propaganda officers he instructed that 'His Majesty's Diplomatic Missions must themselves undertake the task, assisted by His Majesty's Consular Officers, and by Committees of local British subjects; or, in small centres, by individual British subjects' (cited in Taylor 1981: 53)

It would be a mistake to regard this as evidence that propaganda activity became an important part of British diplomatic activities or that diplomats were enthused by the task but it did represent an important marking out of external communications as Foreign Office turf. The central element in the FO model was the importance of news but at the same time there was a gradual recognition of the value of a broader range of activities. Thus it was the Foreign Office that played an important role in creating the British Council. The formation of a cultural relations organization in the UK was strongly influenced by Foreign Office views but it is noticeable that the emergence of the BC was accompanied by struggles with pre-existing quasi-commercial organizations, the Travel Association, and the ministry responsible for external economic affairs The Department of Overseas Trade (Taylor 1981).

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<sup>2</sup> In 1968 The Foreign Office (FO) absorbed the Commonwealth Office to become the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

With the approach of the Second World War the Foreign Office sought to defend its prerogatives by arguing that its communication organization should be the basis for the wartime propaganda machinery. It failed and found itself sharing the organizational space with a recreated Ministry of Information and specialist organizations such as the Political Warfare Executive. In the run up to the Second World War there was an expectation that the BBC would be taken over by the government (Taylor 1999). For a variety of reasons this did not happen and the BBC's external services developed a similar relationship to the FO as the BC, accepting funding and some strategic direction while maintaining operational independence. The BBC developed a rhetoric that drew on elements of cultural relations and national projection .

At the end of the Second World War the Foreign Office again sought to regain control of international communications. The early Cold War saw some interest in the recreation of the Political Warfare Executive and the FCO created a semiautonomous PW organization, the Information Research Department (Defty 1004)

The postwar period saw the fullest statement of the view that external communication is a foreign ministry matter in the Drogheda Report of 1954 (Earl of Drogheda 1954). The Report of the Independent Enquiry into Overseas Information Services was intended to justify increases in expenditure on international communications after years of cuts

It asserted the view that overseas information was a normal part of the armoury of a great power, that it should be properly funded and that because of the intersection between communication and policy responsibility for communication should remain with the FO, it firmly rejected that view that a stronger coordinating organization was required, and approved of the view that information work should mostly be done by foreign service officers (Earl of Drogheda 1954). A view that was reasserted by successive enquiries over the following two decades. Writing in 1968 a former head of the FO information departments referred to the Drogheda report as 'the bible of overseas information work' (Marett 1968). The decade from the mid 1950s marked a high point for 'information work' British foreign policy. Indeed the point was made that during this period a tour in information work was seen as a career enhancing move for ambitious diplomats (Moorhouse 1977) During the 1970s and the 1980s external communications lost its prominence.

The election of the Labour government in 1997 produced two phases of development in public diplomacy. Firstly, in the period after the election coincided with interest in changing the way that the UK was perceived in the world and the result was some engagement with ideas of nation branding although there is little evidence to suggest a fully fledged rebranding effort was ever launched (Leonard 1997). After 9/11 two successive reviews of public diplomacy argued for a more strategic approach it appears that the FCO sought greater influence over the BC which was countered by forceful reiterations of the distinctiveness of cultural relations and the value of autonomy(eg Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004, Wilton 2002, Carter 2005).

A decade after 9/11 and the financial crisis the ability of the FCO to influence the BC and the BBC seems to have waned. Funding of the World Service is being take over by the BBC and the share of government grant in the BC budget is projected to fall to 16% accompanied by a growing divergence between government priorities and British Council priorities.

What is striking about the UK case is the stability of the system that has been created. The components of the system were in place by the late 1930s. It is possible to locate each of the four paradigms within components of the system.

Broadly speaking the FCO enjoys a measure of strategic control but mostly lets the BC and BBC operate independently. However, this continuity does not mean that the relationships are unchanging. Periods of elevated international tension lead to the emergence of political warfare arguments and institutions. The decade since 9/11 and UK involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has led the MoD and the armed forces to embrace ideas of 'strategic communication' which have been taken up by the National Security Council (MoD 2011). It will be interesting to see the extent to which this poses a genuine threat to the long term hegemony of the FCO.

The British Council uses the rhetoric of cultural relations together with the BC's ability to draw on funding from other government departments and from quasi commercial activities such as language teaching to create a dynamic relationship with the FCO, thus there is a certain dynamic that has changed over time depending on the interest and ability of the FCO to exert influence on the BC.

### 3. Germany: Cultural Relations with an Arms Length MFA

In many respects Germany is close to France with the emphasis on cultural relations but is different institutionally appearing closer to the UK a centralized culture relations organization. However, in the post 1945 period the position of the Auswärtiges Amt has been weaker than that of the FCO.

As with France the origins of German external communications is with a variety of private organizations that sprang up in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century primarily with the aim of supporting compatriots who remained outside the borders of the new German state. The best known of these was the Deutscher Schulverein created in 1881 that became better known as the Verein für das Deutschtum in Ausland (VdA) and which continues to exist as Verein für Deutsche Kulturreziehungen im Ausland (Lauren 1976, Hiden 1977, Paschalidis 2009). Despite the focus on German outside the national borders there was an assumption that German culture was both universal and national (Gienow-Hecht 2003).

As in France, the State was drawn in to providing support and a degree of steering for these private organizations. As in the three other countries the First World War led to a huge expansion of external communications facilities that were cut back in 1918 but as in France it rapidly became clear that peace would require organizations that could compete in the international arena. Thus the AA created a cultural section to work with the private organizations particularly concerned with the Ausland Deutsche (Hiden 1977, Michels 2004). The reconstituted press section was controlled jointly with the Chancellor's Office. As France saw after 1870 culture was a tool that could be wielded by the defeated.

One of the most important of these private organizations that emerged after 1918 was the Deutsche Akademie originally founded in 1925 it was intended to support Ausland Deutsche communities but finding the field already crowded repositioned itself to teach German to non-German speakers. Its leadership was quick to see the possibilities offered by the Nazis

as a source of additional funding and the organization began to rework its board to include prominent Nazis (Michels 2004).

After 1945 as after the First World War (West) Germany turned to culture as a way to re-establish its position in the world. This time it operated under three constraints: the record of the Nazi regime, the initial absence of sovereignty and its contest with the East Germany. Culture offered a way to evade these constraints. At the core of these efforts was a new cultural relations organization. The Goethe Institute had originally been the training centre for foreign teachers of German operated by the DA and the new Goethe Institute began with the same function. During the 1950s the AA allowed the GI to take over all German cultural centres and to expand its range of activities (Trommler 2009). Under Ostpolitik culture was proclaimed to be the third pillar of foreign policy alongside traditional diplomacy and economics. With the cultural upheavals of the late 1960s the GI expanded its autonomy and adopted an emphasis on cultural exchange and dialogue rather than simply exporting German culture. The fall of the Berlin Wall allowed an expansion of the GI's role in Eastern Europe (Witte 1999).

The major change in German external communications came in the 1990s as the AA began to take a greater interest in the implications of globalization and develop an interest in branding approaches. The AA also gained responsibility for communications with foreign publics in 2003 a responsibility that had previously been held by the Federal Press Office (Hulsse 2009).

The domination of the cultural relation model was challenged by the rise of an explicit nation-branding perspective emerging from the perception of international economic competition. Although the Goethe Institut is often compared to the British Council it has a narrower remit as it coexists with the Humboldt Institution (dealing with higher education collaborations) and the DAAD (dealing with academic exchanges) as a result the GI has a greater share of 'cultural content in its mix of activities than the BC does.

The German story like the French is dominated by the centrality of culture in the conception of external communication. Lepenies (2006) has argued that German social thought tends to value culture over politics and given the political circumstances of Germany after 1945 foreign cultural policy enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the day to day diplomacy of the AA. In the French case the alignment between culture and policy is taken for granted and there seem to be few doubts that cultural relations can serve the direct interests of foreign policy. In the German case the concern for Germany to be seen as a *Kulturstaat* rather than a *machtstaat* is much more inhibiting of any such action.

#### 4. The United States: The Conflict Model and its Challengers

Although the history of modern US public diplomacy usually starts with the Committee on Public Information, an essentially conflict based organizations, earlier manifestations could be seen in participation in the universal expositions of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and in the congressional mandate on the State Department to promote immigration to the United States. Like the other three cases considered here the end of the First World War saw a rapid dismantling of the communications organization but unlike Britain, France or Germany no peacetime organization emerged.

The result is that the main story of US public diplomacy starts with the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations in the State Department in 1938 (Ninkovich 1981). This was rapidly followed by the emergence of the whole wartime information organization. What is striking in the three other cases after 1945 was a revival of prewar models of external communications. In the US there was an extended period of uncertainty over the need for and organization of peacetime external communication. It is significant for the development of US public diplomacy that the legislative foundations of the programme were put into place under the influence of the emerging Cold War (Cull 2009)

As in the UK escalating East-West tension prompted growing attention to issues of external communication. Cull (2009: 67) makes the point that by the early 1950s external communications was seen through the lens of preparation for wartime psychological warfare, also there was extensive involvement of other agencies especially the CIA and the Economic Cooperation Administration in external communications inevitably creating a demand for cross government coordination mechanisms. Unlike the FO the State Department was unable or reluctant to control the process and chose not to resist pressures for the separation of information activities from the MFA. Indeed John Foster Dulles pushed for the removal of information activities from the State Department into a separate agency (Osgood 2006).. Another source of differentiation from the UK was Britain's engagement with colonial issues that served to moderate the impact of the Cold War on the external communication organization, indeed the Drogheda Report (1954) warned of the danger of becoming too oriented on this conflict. The crucial point is that US PD organization, particularly in the 1950s, reflected the conflict model with the conflict with the Soviet Union as the overriding concern and with the USIA subordinate to governmental level coordinating mechanisms. Despite this the political warfare model did not supplant ideas of cultural relations or national projection. Indeed the continuing struggles over the Voice of America reflected different views of whether it was primarily a tool of national projection, of cultural relations, or political warfare or an extension of diplomacy. The fact that exchanges remained in the State Department opened an additional level of complexity. As critics of the demerger from State had warned the USIA's incorporation into the policy process was intermittent (Cull 2008, Arndt 2005, Osgood 2006).

With the reduction of Cold War tensions in the 1970s new arguments were heard. In particular the Stanton Committee effectively embraced a British model with policy advice and information absorbed into State and all cultural and educational functions in an independent agency and the VOA independent. Despite these recommendations the result was the transfer of those cultural functions that remained in State to the renamed ICA. The resurgence of the Cold War in the 1980s gave new force to the concept of public diplomacy as political warfare (Cull 2008, Arndt 2005, Malone 1988). With the end of the Cold War the response of the USIA was uncertain. Nick Cull points to the expanding role of USAID as a missed opportunity for the USIA, Nancy Snow complains a move to national projection (Cull 2010, Snow 2002).

The merger of the USIA with the State Department in 1999 came about as a matter of budgetary necessity rather than as a sign that an imperialistic foreign ministry had embraced a vision of an expanded diplomacy. The arrival of the War on Terror generated a new set of demands for the application of a political warfare model and led to an expansion of the DoD involvement in the external communications game as well as the search for new

mechanisms of institutional coordination. Indeed it can be argued that the approaches of two the holders of the role of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy for Public Diplomacy during the past decade reflect two contrasting approaches. Charlotte Beers is best remembered for her shared values advertising campaign – a perfect example of national projection – while James Glassman advocated discrediting Al-Qaida by publicising their violence – an example of a political warfare approach. Glassman is also associated with the advocacy of the use of social media in public diplomacy and it might be argued that the enthusiasm for social media in the Obama Administration's foreign policy may mark the emergence of a genuine extended diplomacy position that public diplomacy should be seen as an extension of diplomacy (State 2010).

The US case can be seen as a situation where external communications has been strongly influenced by the successive periods of conflict but where this conflict orientation has never completely supplanted the other paradigms. Compared with the other three cases the US has seen a higher degree of organizational instability and weaker role of the MFA.

### Conclusions

The central argument running through this paper is that there are different ways of thinking about, organizing for and hence doing external communications. This paper has suggested a way of describing these differences by identifying four prototypical ways of thinking about 'public diplomacy' and exploring the way that they map onto to organizational fields.

The ideal types provide a useful preliminary shorthand for describing how particular countries (and particular agencies or programmes within countries) approach external communications. We need to be cautious about rushing to judgement about applying the typology without developing a sense of the complexity of national public diplomacy systems. For instance how do we conceptualize the autonomy of cultural relations organizations? The British Council's MFA funding is part of the MFA's budget vote whereas the Goethe Institut's budget is separate but forms a larger share of the Intitute's income than the BC's funding. There is scope for a more rigorous development of typologies using the type of formal methods advocated by Howard Becker or Charles Ragin (Becker 1998, Ragin 1987, Ragin 2008) but we these need to be based on a good level of understanding of national systems.

The point is not that any one of these paradigms is right or that there is a particular balance between that ought to be observed. The most important conclusion is that debates on external communications are conducted in the context of particular national histories. One of the values of comparative research is that it shows up what elements of a national experience are common to other countries and which are distinctive.

Although preliminary the analysis here generates a number of findings.

The cultural context matters. There are definite differences between the continental and Anglo-Saxon approaches. The priority to cultural relations in France and Germany reflects a different conception of the role of culture. Within the UK and the US there has been a

greater emphasis on the relations and in Germany and France on the culture within cultural relations.

Starting points and path dependencies matter. French and German programmes started as support for private cultural relations initiatives. In the period after 1918 when peacetime external communications were being constructed the French and German networks of schools and cultural institutes became a focus of attention in these ministries. In the UK the absence of such networks seems to have meant a greater attention to media and information work. These patterns have persisted.

What looks like a big problem within one national discussion may not be. The French model seems extremely relaxed about government engagement in the cultural or international broadcasting areas realm whereas in the UK, Germany and the US this seems to be regarded as a big issue.

There are patterns in the evolution of public diplomacy organizations. In all four of the cases the period after the end of the Cold War led to a greater interest in projection (branding) whether this is a functional adaptation to a changing environment or an example of institutional isomorphism is a subject for research.

Developing comparative research on national models of PD is the easy bit of this research area, understanding effects is much harder, but it is a necessary part of developing the research area.

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